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THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
—000O000— 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20050815-SC 
JOHN VONDERHAAR HALTOM, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
—000O000— 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to § 78-
2-2(3)(a) and § 78-2-2(5) U.C.A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 .Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that finding of simple negligence was 
sufficient for conviction of the crime of dealing in materials harmful to a minor? On 
certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness, 
giving its conclusions no deference. State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305 (Utah 
2005). 
2. Does the evidence in this case, reviewed in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff, prove a violation of the ordinance under which it was brought? 
This issue was preserved for appeal by Defendant's Motion for Directed 
Verdict (R. 677 p. 156; renewed, p. 307) and by Motion to Arrest Judgment (R. 462-
4). Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 
1994). A judgment must be upheld against a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence unless it is against the clear weight of the evident *>i unless llns Com) 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Spanish Fork 
City v. Bryan. 1999 UT App 61, 975 P.2d 510 (Utah App. 1999). Defendant must 
marshal the evidence in favor of the Plaintiff and show that it is not sufficient. See In 
re Beasley. 883 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1994).-
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT 
ISSUE 
§ 76-10-1206 U.C.A. 
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing 
that a person is a minor, or having failed to exercise reasonable care in 
ascertaining the proper age of a minor, he: 
(a) intentionally distributed or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to 
exhibit to a minor any material harmful to minors; 
(b) intentionally produces, presents, or directs any performance before 
2 
a minor that is harmful to minors; or 
(c) intentionally participates in any performances before a minor, that is 
harmful to minors. 
§76-2-102 U.C.A. 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, 
and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state 
and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall 
involve strict liability is the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a 
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the 
conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable 
mental state. 
§ 76-2-103 U.C.A. 
A person engages in conduct: 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously with respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of, but consciously 
disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the results will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial an unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that 
the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise in all of the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint. 
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§ 76-2-104 
(1) If acting with criminal negligence is sufficient to establish the culpable 
mental state for an element of an offense, that element is also established if a 
person acts intentionally or knowingly. 
(2) If acting recklessly is sufficient to establish the culpable mental state for an 
element of an offense, that element is also established if a person acts 
intentionally or knowingly. 
(3) If acting knowingly is sufficient to establish the culpable mental state for 
an element of an offense, that element is also established if a person acts 
intentionally. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant John Haltom was, at the time of the incident, a co-owner of a 
business known as Doctor John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique, located at 6885 
South State Street in Midvale, Utah (R. 677 p. 154) This business involves the sale 
of lingerie, swim wear, shoes and other clothing items, and novelties. Those 
novelties run from lotions, oils and candles, to the more exotic. At the time of this 
incident, they included "adult toys" or "marital aids" and some adult videos and 
books. From the day that the opening of his store was announced, there has been 
ongoing civil litigation between the City and Haltom over what could be sold, and on 
4 
what terms. See Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom. 2003 UT 26, 73 P.3d 334 (Utah 
2003). Not long after the opening of the store, on August 4, 2000, Defendant was 
charged with selling an adult videotape to a minor, a third degree felony. 
The store in Midvale was set up in late July, 2000, and opened in the last week 
of that month. Detective Dean Brimley of the Midvale Police sent an underage boy 
into the store to try and obtain an adult video on August 1. The boy was met at the 
door by an employee who requested I.D., and immediately turned him away. IdL p. 
66. The second try, however, was successful, when the 17 year old daughter of a 
police officer purchased an adult video. 
Plaintiff s case in chief was presented by three witnesses. The first witness was 
Brittany Pearson, the daughter of the former Midvale Assistant Police Chief. She had 
volunteered to go into Doctor John's store, to see if she could purchase an adult video 
(Id. pp. 27, 30-31). Upon entering the store on the afternoon of August 4, 2000, she 
was met at the door by an employee, later identified as Vadim Sapargueldiev, who 
immediately requested her ID. She showed him her Utah Drivers License, a blow-up 
of which was admitted as an exhibit at trial. After looking at the ID, Saperguildiev 
allowed her into the store, which was restricted to those over eighteen years of age. 
(Id. pp. 35-38). After wandering around the store for a couple of minutes, she went 
5 
to the adult video rack in the far back corner of the store, and approached the desk to 
purchase a video (Id.). Shortly thereafter, she saw Haltom come to the counter. (Id 
p. 39). She was asked to produce her identification again, and she handed it to 
Haltom, who said something to the effect of "we need to check and just make sure" 
that she was the person on the license. (Id pp. 39-40). He verified her address, may 
have asked for her social security number, and appeared to compare her photo with 
her features (Id p. 40, 48). When she answered correctly, as to her address, Haltom 
seemed satisfied with her identification and permitted Sapergueldiev to sell her the 
video. She then purchased the video and left (Id pp. 40-41). She never looked at the 
video, and took it directly to the police station where she handed it over to Detective 
Brimley (Id p. 42). She later returned to the store with officer Jarvis, "to identify the 
people who had looked at my drivers license." (Id p. 52). 
The second witness, Detective Dean Brimley, testified that he was, in the 
summer of 2000, the Midvale City Vice Officer (Id pp. 62-63). Late in July of that 
year, Doctor John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique opened in Midvale. The 
merchandise sole in the store included adult videos (Id pp. 63-64). Detective Brimley 
went to the store shortly prior to August 1,2000 and purchased a video (Id p. 64). He 
testified that he was asked to determine whether minors would have access to similar 
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materials. As a result, he sent a 17 year old boy into the store to attempt to buy an 
adult video. According to Detective Brimley "his ID was checked, and he was sent 
out of the store, no purchase made." (Id p. 64-66). Given this failure, he searched for 
additional minors willing to attempt to make a purchase, and Assistant Chief Pearson 
indicated that his daughter Brittany, age 17, would be available (Id p. 66). Detective 
Brimley followed her to the store, and then back to the station, where she gave him 
a video entitled "Getting Wet, the Last Howl" purchased from the store. (Id pp. 71-
72). l 
The third witness was Sergeant Ken Jarvis of the Midvale Police Department, 
who went to the store after the purchase had been made. Ms. Pearson identified 
Haltom as someone who had looked at her license but not as the person who sold her 
the video. (Id p . . 141). Sgt. Jarvis indicated to Haltom that an adult video had been 
sold to a minor. He described Defendant as shocked at the news. According to 
Sergeant Jarvis, "his mouth dropped", and "it appeared the color dropped from his 
face". He was "stunned." (Id pp. 145-6). Haltom later identified Sapergueldiev as 
the person who first checked Pearson's I.D. and sold her the video (Id p. 144). 
1
 Haltom does not contest that the video is adult in nature and was not to be sold to anyone 
under 18. 
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Haltom was in Utah to set up the new store, including supervising the 
remodeling of the building, stocking merchandise, hiring staff, and dealing with the 
City and the media concerning the opening (Id pp. 217-220). Haltom and employees 
Emily Wright, Teresa Ferrone, and Bonnie Bolton testified that the store had in place 
a regular procedure to check identification to keep out minors. (R. 677 pp. 178-179, 
182-183,190-195,200-202,212-215,). On atleast one occasion withinaweek of the 
incident at issue, the system worked, and a minor was barred from the store. On 
August 4th, she entered.2 For whatever reason, Sapergueldiev violated store policy 
and allowed her inside (for which he was promptly terminated)(Id. P. 214). It was 
only after the first check had inexplicably failed that Defendant became involved, at 
the specific request of the employee. Haltom testified that this was not part of his 
regular duties with the business, that he was in his office on the second floor at the 
time, and that he was specifically called down not to check on age, but to answer a 
question on the verification of identity (IdL pp. 220-222). His testimony and that of 
Ms. Pearson do not conflict. He concentrated on the identification of Ms. Pearson, 
rather than her age. He asked her for personal information from the license, which she 
2
 Defendant's Exhibit 7, a store promotional video tape shows Saperguildiev checking I.D.'s 
at the door; and witnesses Wright, Ferrone and Bolton identified him as being involved in their 
training on this point. (R. 677; pp.179, 191, 201, 208. 209.213). 
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was able to produce, and he seemed satisfied, allowing Sapergueldiev to finish selling 
her the video (Id pp. 222-228). Clearly, Haltom was doing someone else's job, 
something he never did, and looking at a license with which he was not familiar. He 
testified that he only did what he was asked to do by his most experienced and trusted 
employee and that was to review with the employee hot to detect false I.D. (Id.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Court of Appeals erred in determining that the applicable standard of 
conduct for this crime was simple negligence, a standard usually reserved for civil 
cases. The application of such a standard in a case with First Amendment 
implications violates Defendant's rights under the First Amendment. The application 
of that standard by the Court of Appeals without notice to Defendant or a chance to 
contest it, denies Defendant Due Process of Law under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I Sec. 5 of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
II. Defendant is not guilty as a matter of law of the crime of dealing in 
materials harmful to a minor, as his conduct does not meet the legal standard of 
criminal negligence. The uncontroverted evidence is that he was called in to the store 
9 
by an employee who was charged with checking Identification, and excluding minors. 
The employee had a specific question which did not involve the age of the person 
attempting to purchase the material. His failure to check age a second time, after a 
trusted employee had done it once, is not criminal negligence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT A FINDING OF 
ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DEFENDANT. 
Defendant John Haltom was convicted by a jury trial of dealing in material 
harmful to a minor, a violation of § 76-10-1206 U.C. A. The material is an item which 
the store held for sale to adults only. There was no evidence that Haltom 
intentionally sold an adult movie to a minor. In fact, there is no dispute that he only 
got involved in the transaction after another person checked the minor's I.D., and 
allowed her into the store. Neither did he actually make the sale. The question 
therefore was whether he violated the law in failing to stop the sale to a minor, even 
though this was not his direct responsibility. The Court, in accordance with § 76-2-
103 U.C.A., properly instructed the jury: 
10 
A person fails to use reasonable care within the meaning of the law when he 
acts recklessly. A person acts recklessly when he is aware of, but consciously 
disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the results will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. 
The standard put to the jury is the same as criminal negligence, or that degree 
of negligence necessary to convict Haltom of a serious crime, in this case a Third 
Degree Felony. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the lower standard of 
simple negligence, normally used in civil cases, applied: 
"Reasonable care" is defined as "[t]hat degree of care which a person of 
ordinary prudence would exercise in the same or similar circumstances, [and 
f]ailure to exercise such care is ordinary negligence." Black's Law Dictionary 
1265 (6th ed. 1990). Haltom has presented us with no reason to believe that the 
legislature intended a different meaning, or with any case law that would 
support his position in the face of this language. (Emphasis in original). State 
v. Haltom. 2005 UT App. 348, 532 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,120. 
The Court of Appeals described the standard of criminal negligence in State v. 
Larsen. 2000 UT App 106, 999 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). The Court there 
said: 
Conduct is not criminally negligent unless it constitutes a 'gross deviation' 
from the standard of care exercised by an ordinary person." State v. Standiford, 
769 P.2d 254,267 (Utah 1998). "[Ordinary negligence, which is the basis for 
l i 
a civil action for damages, is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence." 
Id In State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 (Utah App. 1989), this Court explained, 
"[m]ere inattention or mistake in a judgment resulting even in death of another 
is not criminal unless the quality of the act makes it so."' IcL at 1207; see 21 
Am.Jur. 2d Criminal Law §136 (1998) ("The 'negligence' required in this 
context must be more than the lack of ordinary care and precaution; it must be 
something more than the mere inadvertence or misadventure, but rather a 
recklessness or indifference incompatible with a proper regard for human 
life."). Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, f 18. 
The defendant in Larsen had been convicted of negligent homicide, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, for his failure to yield at an intersection, and turning left in front of 
another vehicle. With regard to the defendant's negligence, the Court went on to say: 
In this case, defendant's conduct, while apparently negligent, does not rise to 
the level of criminal negligence. Defendant's conduct is more accurately 
characterized as a serious mistake in judgment. The facts presented at trial do 
not indicate that defendant's action were undertaken recklessly or with an 
indifference to human life, nor does the quality of defendant's act lead to the 
conclusion that his actions were criminal. Rather, defendant simply failed to 
see an oncoming car which was visible to other drivers as he made a left turn, 
with tragic consequences. Larsen, 2000 Utah App 106, f 21. 
The Court of Appeals erred by using the normally civil standard of ordinary or 
simple negligence here. The evidence here does not support a finding that Haltom 
was reckless and that his conduct constituted "a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise." This is especially true in light of the 
12 
fact that it was Sapargueldiev who initially reviewed the I.D. and who made the sale 
after twice reviewing Pearson's license. Sapergueldiev diverted Haltom's attention 
to the validity of the identification of the person, and away from the customer's age. 
By asking Haltom to verify the identity and not the date of birth, there certainly was 
an implied representation from Sapergueldiev that the customer was of age.3 Haltom 
relied on this senior employee and others trained by him to check age, a management 
step taken by many business owners around the country every day. Given the fact 
that he properly relied on his employees, any mistake in judgment by Haltom did not 
rise to the standard of criminal negligence. 
The Court of Appeals recently had occasion to revisit their decision in Larsen, 
in State v. Boss. 2005 UT App 520 (Utah App., Dec. 8, 2005). In a footnote, the 
Court compared reckless behavior with criminal negligence: 
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (2003) (stating persons act recklessly 
when they are "aware of but consciously disregard a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk" (emphasis added)), with id. § 76-2-103(4) (stating that 
persons act with criminal negligence when they "ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will 
3Because the regular business practice was to check identification as a customer entered the 
store, the fact that Pearson had been admitted at the front door was also evidence that her age had 
been verified prior to Sapargueldiev calling Haltom down to review the I.D. 
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occur" (emphasis added)). Criminal negligence, like recklessness, and unlike 
ordinary negligence, requires a gross deviation from the applicable standard of 
care. See State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988) (comparing and 
contrasting reckless manslaughter with negligent homicide). The risk of death 
required for recklessness and for criminally negligent conduct is the same; the 
only difference between the two is whether the defendant was aware of that 
risk. See id.: see also State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 206 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (describing the distinction between reckless manslaughter and negligent 
homicide as whether person perceives risk of death, not degree of perception 
of risk). Therefore, despite the Larsen court's reference to recklessness, our 
decision in that case was correct, because it hinged upon the court's 
determination that the evidence was insufficient to show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant's conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard 
of care. See Larsen, 2000 UT App 106 at 127. Id Fn. 2. 
The Court, stated "we agree with the State that the 'reckless' and 'indifferent' 
language we employed in Larsen is unfortunate and should not be read to substitute 
recklessness for the relevant standards set forth in § 76-2-103(4)." (Id.). The Court 
explained that the difference between the recklessness referred to in Larsen and 
criminal negligence is the degree of awareness of the substantial and unjustifiable 
risk. Criminal negligence requires only that a person "ought to be aware" of the 
substantial risk. That implied awareness must be accompanied by "a gross deviation 
from the standard of care." Under either definition, the conduct of Defendant here is 
not sufficient because there was no such gross deviation.. 
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In rejecting Haltom's argument, the Court of Appeals cited a case from this 
Court, State v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376,378-79 (Utah 1983), in which the Court ruled 
that the use of the term "negligence" in the automobile homicide statute denoted 
simple negligence. The Court of Appeals in Larsen correctly stated the law: 
"[Ojrdinary negligence which is the basis for a civil action for damages, is not 
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence." Exceptions to that clear rule should be, 
and are, rare. In Hamblin, the simple negligence was not sufficient in itself to convict 
of the crime. The statute required a separate deliberate act, driving under the 
influence of alcohol, in combination with the negligence; and that certainly is 
sufficient to distinguish it here. This case must also be distinguished because of its 
First Amendment implications. Selling written or pictorial material which might be 
objectionable to some, but which has not been adjudged legally obscene is protected 
by both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 15 of 
the Constitution of Utah. Therefore, while the sale of such material might cause some 
danger that it might be sold to a minor, it is a risk that society must take (with 
reasonable safeguards) to encourage the free flow of ideas. This is not the same sort 
of danger inherent in drunk driving and cannot be remedied in the same manner. As 
15 
this Court has stated: 
When state action impinges on fundamental rights, due process requires 
standards which clearly define the scope of permissible conduct so as to avoid 
unwarranted intrusion on those rights. A statute which affects fundamental 
liberties is unconstitutional if it is so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning. In re Bover. 636 P.2d 1085, 1087-8 
(Utah 1981). 
It is the duty of the Court to construe the statute to avoid constitutional 
problems if possible. JkL The obvious corollary is that any uncertainty in statutory 
terms must be resolved favorably to Haltom. 
Just last year, the Florida Supreme Court discussed at some length the 
requirement of mens rea in State v. Giorgetti. 868 So.2d 512 (Fla. 2004): 
Initially, we would note that the Legislature generally has broad authority to 
determine any requirement for intent or knowledge in the definition of a crime. 
See Reynolds v. State. 842 So.2d 46,49 (Fla. 2002). To determine whether the 
Legislature included a knowledge requirement in any given statute, we first 
look to the statute's plain language. Id In the instant case, however, the sexual 
offender registration statutes provide no explicit guidance as to whether the 
Legislature intended there to be a knowledge requirement for proving a 
violation of the statute. See § 943.0435, Fla. Stat. (2000); § 944.607(9), Fla. 
Stat. (2000). The statutory provisions dealing with the sexual offender 
registration requirements simply contain no express direction. 
At common law, all crimes consisted of both an act or omission coupled with 
a requisite guilty knowledge or mens rea. See United States v. Balint. 258 U.S. 
250, 251, 42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922). Hence, as a general rule, guilty 
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knowledge or mens rea was a necessary element in the proof of every crime. 
Id, see also United States v. United States Gvpsum Co.. 438 U.S. 422,436,98 
S.Ct. 2864, 57 :.Ed.2d 854 (1978) ("The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, 
rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal 
jurisprudence."). Subsequently, as chronicled in numerous U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions, this rule was followed with regard to statutorily defined crimes, 
even if the statute did not expressly include a knowledge requirement. See 
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 
(1994) ("[SJilence . . . does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to 
dispense with a conventional mens rea element, which would require that the 
defendant knows the facts that make his conduct illegal."). In fact, the United 
States Supreme Court "has on a number of occasions read a state-of-mind 
component into an offense even when the statutory definition did not in terms 
so provide." United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437, 98 S.Ct. 2864. 
Moreover, because of the strength of the traditional rule that requires mens rea, 
offenses that require no mens rea are generally disfavored. Staples, 511 U.S. 
at 606, 114 S.Ct. 1793. 
Thus the Supreme Court has concluded that "some indication of congressional 
intent, express or implied, is required to dispense with mens rea as an element 
of a crime." Id In other words, the Court has virtually created a presumption 
in favor of a guilty knowledge element absent an express provision to the 
contrary. Id. at 515 
This policy is consistent with the concept that criminal sanctions are ordinarily 
reserved for acts of intentional misconduct. Chicone also noted the judicial 
policy that "[t]he group of offenses punishable without proof of any criminal 
intent must be sharply limited." Id (quoting Francis Bowes Sayre, Public 
Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L.Rev. 55, 70 (1933)). Moreover, as the U.S. 
Supreme Court has noted, although the legislature has the broad authority to 
define the elements of a crime, the legislature must still "act within any 
acceptable constitutional constraints in defining criminal offenses." Liparota 
v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 n. 6, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.ed.2d 434 
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(1985). 
In Chicone. we relied extensively on Judge Co wart's opinion in State v. Oxx. 
417 So.2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In Oxx, Judge Cowart recognized three 
possible restraints on the Legislature's power to eliminate scienter 
requirements from a statute: (1) statutes that codify common law mala in se or 
"infamous" crimes where intent is considered to be so inherent in the concept 
of the common law offense that it is deemed included as an element; (2) 
statutes that would tend to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights if intent 
were not required: and (3) statutes that impose an affirmative duty to act on an 
individual and then penalize the failure to act. (Emphasis added) Id. at 516-
517. 
Defendant, who engages in the sale of material protected by the First 
Amendment as expression, contends that this statute falls within both the second and 
third categories above. Failing to include a scienter requirement would chill the 
exercise of First Amendment rights. The Court went on to say: 
Because scienter is often necessary to comport with due process requirements, 
we ascribe the Legislature with having intended to include such a requirement. 
Cf. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.. 513 U.S. 64, 73, 115 S.Ct. 464, 
130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994) (noting, in case where intent was read into statute to 
avoid constitutionality problems, "we do not impute to Congress an intent to 
pass legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution as construed by this 
Court"). Id at 518. 
See also City of Colorado Springs v. 2354. Inc.. 896 P.2d 272 (Colo. 1995). 
The Supreme Court there reviewed an ordinance which allowed the revocation of a 
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business license for a sexually oriented business if an employee violated any portion 
of the licensing ordinance. The Court stated: 
In addition, as the trial court observed, section 8-1-801(D) of the Code is not 
narrowly tailored at all. Any violation of any legislative prohibition triggers 
mandatory suspension or revocation. Section 8-1-801 of the Code contains no 
criteria indicating what circumstances warrant suspension as opposed to 
revocation. Such a sweeping regulation, however appropriate in other contexts, 
is not narrowly drawn to insure maximum opportunity for constitutionally 
protected modes of expression. In view of the danger of censorship and 
arbitrary suppression inherent in the application of imprecise standards, 
regulations granting government officials excessive discretion to regulate 
constitutionally protected modes of expression are unconstitutional on their 
face. Knuz v. New York. 340 U.S. 291, 71 S.Ct. 312, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951); 
Lovellv. Griffin. 303 U.S. 444,58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938); see Vance 
v. Universal Amusement Co.. 445 U.S. 308, 311 n. 3,100 S.Ct. 1156,1159 n. 
3, 63 L.Ed.2d 413 (1980). We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the 
provisions of section 8-1-801(D) of the Code are invalid as applied to sexually 
explicit business licensees. WL at 297. 
In United States v. X-Citement Video. Inc.. 513 U.S. 64 (1994) the Court dealt 
with the statute which prohibited "knowingly" transporting child pornography in 
interstate commerce. The Ninth Circuit had held the law facially unconstitutional 
because it did not require a similar scienter requirement regarding the age of the 
performer. The Supreme Court read into the statute the requirement that the 
Defendant also knew of the presence of a minor in such material, even though the 
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statute did not directly say so. The Supreme Court said: 
A final canon of statutory construction supports the reading that the term 
"knowingly" applies to both elements. Cases such as Ferber. 458 U.S. at 765 
("as with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be imposed without 
some element of scienter on the part of the defendant"); Smith v. California. 
361 U.S. 147 (1959); Hamling v. United States. 418 U.S. 87 (1974) and 
Osborne v. Ohio. 495 U.S. 103,115 (1990), suggest that a statute completely 
bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of the performers would raise 
serious constitutional doubts. It is therefore incumbent upon us to read the 
statute to eliminate those doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly 
contrary to the intent of Congress. Id at 78. 
These cases surely support the contention that, in the area of distribution of 
non-obscene and constitutionally protected adult materials, mere negligence in 
distributing to a minor is not a constitutionally sound standard. The affirmative duty 
which is required here is the duty to take reasonable measures to see that distribution 
is not made to minors; and violating that duty requires more than mere negligence. 
Under the heading of "Principles of Criminal Responsibility" and the subheading of 
"Culpability generally", is § 76-2-102 U.C.A., which sets forth the "culpable mental 
state required". That statute seriously narrows the category of criminal statutes 
which do not require "intent, knowledge, or recklessness". That statute requires a 
culpable mental state unless a clear intention of the Legislature is expressed to make 
20 
the offense one of strict liability. The very next section of the Code, §76-2-103 
U.C. A. includes the definitions necessary to establish criminal intent. Likewise, § 76-
2-104 reiterates the various standards sufficient to convict of specific crimes, and 
omits any reference to simple negligence. The specific statute which Defendant 
was accused of violating here uses the word "intentionally" in each of its three 
subsections describing the prohibited conduct. Regarding the age of the other person, 
the statute requires either knowledge or the failure "to exercise reasonable care". 
While this obviously includes a lower standard than that of knowledge, it is error to 
read it as simple negligence, for the same reasons set out in X-Citement Video. 
The crime of which Defendant stands convicted is not an infraction or minor 
misdemeanor. It is a felony, punishable by up to five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Admittedly, the sentence of the Court did not include such a prison term, though 
Defendant has already served 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. The conviction 
of a felony is a serious consequence. Defendant has long been a hunter, and is now 
precluded from purchasing a firearm for use in such an activity. He is now a resident 
of the State of Nebraska, which has a disability provision in its voting law for 
convicted felons. Defendant remains on probation, which always carries the 
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possibility of additional jail time for unrelated violations, such as a failure to report. 
With such serious consequences, a simple negligence standard cannot be appropriate. 
The Principles of "Criminal Responsibility" at the beginning of the Utah Criminal 
Code, is a road map for interpreting the rest of the Code. The State apparently makes 
the belated argument for a lower standard of responsibility because of the lack of 
strong support for its original contention that Defendant did act, under the 
circumstances, with criminal negligence. The definition of criminal negligence 
specifically requires the finder of fact to look to "all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint." Those circumstances and that standpoint should take 
into account the presence of Sapergeldiev, the corporation's senior employee 
specifically charged with the business of screening customers for age. With that 
circumstance in mind, Defendant's conduct does not, as a matter of law, constitute 
criminal negligence. 
The Court of Appeals faulted Haltom for presenting "no reason to believe that 
the legislature intended a different meaning, or with any case law which would 
support his position in the face of this language." Haltom believes he did exactly that 
in citing Larsen. But the Court of Appeals erred in putting this burden on Haltom in 
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the first place. The trial court agreed with Haltom as to the standard of negligence 
required and gave a jury instruction which supported that standard. It did so without 
objection from the State. Given that the issue was settled before the trial court, 
Haltom had no notice of the need the matter in detail to the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals previously ruled that an argument not made before the 
trial court is waived on appeal, unless there is "plain error. " See State v. Smit. 95 
P.3d 1203, 2004 UT App 222, f 28 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) ("To demonstrate plain 
error, 'a defendant has the burden of showing '(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and(iii) the error is harmful.'"). Since the 
first and third points above apply to virtually all appeals, the focus of "plain error" 
review is that the error should have been obvious to the trial judge. In its Brief to the 
Court of Appeals, the State referred to the alleged error of the trial court in giving its 
jury instruction, only in passing, (Appellee's Br. 19-20), and it did not argue plain 
error or cite any case law which clearly showed the error. This Court observes the 
same standards for "plain error" review. See State v. Cruz. 530 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 
2005 UT 45, f 18 n.2 (Utah 2005). In this regard, this Court cited with approval the 
additional Federal requirement that the error must "seriously affect the fairness, 
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integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id Certainly, the State cannot 
claim any such thing here, as the jury found the level of criminal negligence 
necessary to convict Haltom. Either the State must have shown that the jury was 
correct; or Haltom must have been put on notice that serious defense of the trial 
court's ruling on this point is expected. The Court of Appeals ruled that Haltom did 
not effectively defend the trial court's negligence standard even though there was no 
reason to believe that this standard was in contention. Certainly, this cannot be the 
law, as such a ruling would violate Defendant's right to Due Process of Law.. 
Only at oral arguments did the State forcefully argue that the trial court's 
standard was incorrect, and even then, there was no citation of controlling authority. 
It should be noted in this context that the legislature acted to clarify the standard of 
negligence in this particular crime, while the matter was under advisement in the 
Court of Appeals. The 2004 legislature, in House Bill 260, changed the law to 
require "having negligently or recklessly failed to determine the proper age of a 
minor." Both sides filed Supplemental Authority letters claiming that this enhanced 
their position. Haltom emphasized the term "recklessly" and claimed that this was 
the dominant theme in the amended law. The State claimed that it was now even 
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more clear that the standard was simple negligence. When read in conjunction with 
the requirement of recklessness, Defendant contends that the 2004 legislature was 
clarifying that the standard of negligence was criminal. That decision, of course, is 
not currently before this Court. In reading the statutory change, however, however, 
two things are clear: first, that any relaxation of the standard would not apply to this 
defendant; and second, that the legislature seemed to believe the standard unclear, 
and that a clarification was necessary. If so, Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of any 
doubt as to the standard at the time of the incident. 
In a footnote to this case, regarding the standard of negligence required, the 
Court of Appeals said: 
The trial court's instruction forced the State to meet a higher mens rea standard 
than required under the statute, and because the principles underlying "simple 
negligence" are incorporated within the definition of recklessness, the jury 
must have, by necessity, found Haltom also to be negligent when they 
determined that he had been reckless. Cf. Utah code Ann. § 76-2-104 (2003). 
Therefore, although the trial court erred in instructing the jury, the error could 
not have prejudiced Haltom and was thus harmless. 2005 UT App 348, f 21 
n.5. 
That statement apparently was made without much thought as to the 
consequences. Haltom was never put on notice that he was litigating a tort case 
25 
where civil principles were involved. If Haltom had known this, of course, his 
counsel would have asked for additional instructions on proximate cause, 
contributory negligence, comparative negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and possibly other 
tort doctrines. More importantly, he could have shown that the negligence of 
Sapergueldiev was the proximate cause of the sale.4 If simple negligence is the 
standard, it becomes obvious who should be held liable. Petitioner introduced 
testimony tending to show that Sapergueldiev knew ahead of time about the attempt 
to get a minor into the store to purchase an adult video (Testimony of Curtis Gorman, 
R. 677 pp. 264-286). Whether or not that is true, we do know that Sapergueldiev 
failed in his duty (one that he had performed many times before), that he personally 
involved Haltom in a situation that he had been delegated to handle, and that he 
diverted Haltom's attention from the issue of age. His negligence was obviously 
substantially more than that of Haltom and was the primary cause of the illegal sale. 
The law may impose a duty of care to the public at large, on all those who participate 
in selling adult videos, but the primary duty of care in this case belonged to 
4It has never been answered satisfactorily why Sapergueldiev was not charged with a crime 
arising out of this incident. 
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Sapergueldiev. This Court stated the rule in Feree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1989): 
To establish negligence or gross negligence, a plaintiff must first establish a 
duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Duty is a "question of 
whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of a particular 
plaintiff. . . ." The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law 
to be determined by the court. 
The duty of Sapergueldiev to his employer is without question. Failure to do 
his regular and routine job of excluding minors from obtaining access to adult videos 
(and from even entering the store) could be catastrophic to his employer (and was so 
here). Compounding the problem by asking his boss to get personally involved in 
floor work where he normally did not go, and then distracting his attention from the 
issue of age, was all negligent. Having no knowledge of the standard which would 
be imposed later by the Court of Appeals, Haltom was unable to present the question 
to the jury of whose negligence was the "proximate cause" of the injury. While the 
tort doctrine of respondent superior might impose vicarious civil liability on the 
corporate employer, it certainly does not impose criminal liability on Haltom. 
Imposing criminal liability on a supervisor or employer for the acts of another 
also violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process of Law requirement. Attached as 
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Appendix B is a copy of the unpublished case of Lee v. City of Newport. No. 91-
5158, 1991 WL 227750 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1991). In that case, the City attempted to 
revoke a business license of an adult entertainment establishment, based on criminal 
convictions of two employees for prostitution, occurring on the same occasion. The 
evidence showed that the management of the establishment was unaware of such 
conduct and that immediate measures were taken to protect against any repetition of 
it. This situation is essentially similar, as the supervisor (Haltom) is being punished 
for acts primarily committed by the employee (Sapergueldiev), which had never 
occurred before, and of which he was unaware. That essentially vicarious liability 
violates Haltom's right to Due Process. 
Section 32A-1-301 U.C.A. et seq. provides that proof of age must be requested 
by those selling alcoholic beverages. Violation of that law is only a Class B 
misdemeanor (§ 32A-1-305 U.C.A.). Nevertheless, § 32A-1-304(3) U.C.A. relieves 
a person of liability if he "acted in good faith" in examining proof of age and 
attempting to prevent an unlawful sale. While there is no similar statutory provision 
in relationship to adult media, clearly Due Process and the First Amendment requires 
the Court to construe the instant statute to include such a requirement. The inclusion 
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of the word "intentionally" three times in the subject statute supports a similar 
requirement. The State did not meet its burden of proof in this regard, and Haltom's 
conviction should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Regarding a claim that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict, this 
Court has held: 
To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support a jury verdict, the 
one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict 
and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789,799 
(Utah 1991). 
The Court of Appeals, in West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 
1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991) went a step further by saying that the Defendant "must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial [that] supports the very findings [it] resists." 
Appellate courts, in their discussion of insufficient evidence, have repeatedly 
held that it is the j ob of the Defendant to attack the sufficiency of Plaintiff s evidence, 
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not set forth their own contradictory evidence. This is a crime, however, involving 
criminal negligence. The existence of a system reasonably calculated to avoid the 
unlawful results, is a defense. 
The State, in its Brief below, suggested that Defendant did not properly 
marshal the evidence in this case, as required by several Utah cases, including State 
v. Martinez. 2002 UT App 126,47 P.3d 1115 (Utah App. 2002). Defendant did, in 
fact, carefully set forth the evidence introduced against Defendant by Plaintiffs, and 
avoided the trap of weighing such evidence against that introduced by Defendant. 
The State appeared to later admit that fact, on page 16 of its Brief, when it stated "a 
brief summary of the marshaled facts and their reasonable inferences establishes that 
Defendant recklessly failed to ascertain Brittany's age before selling her an adult 
video". The State thus listed all of the evidence that Defendant did marshal, asserting 
that it was sufficient to establish Defendant's guilt. The State did not actually assert 
that Defendant left out any relevant evidence that would be necessary to the 
marshaling requirement. Therefore, the State's argument that the marshaling 
requirement was not met, is without merit. 
The existence of a system reasonably calculated to avoid unlawful results is a 
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defense to negligence, most certainly to criminal negligence. The evidence was 
uncontradicted that Doctor John's did have in place such a system. Several people 
testified that an employee was always assigned to the door area, and that the primary 
duty of that employee was to check identification and keep out minors. It worked the 
first time that Midvale Police attempted to get a minor into the store. Sapergueldiev, 
was not new at this responsibility. He was featured on a video tape, produced by 
Doctor John's store in Nebraska before the Midvale store opened, demonstrating the 
procedure. Part of the reason he was in Utah was for the purpose of training new 
employees on avoiding just this problem. (R. 677 p. 219). He had been responsible 
for training employees in Nebraska, including witness Bonnie Bolton, one of 
Haltom's senior employees. (IcL p. 201). Haltom was in his office upstairs at the 
time of the incident and was only called down by Sapergueldiev because of his 
expressed concern that perhaps Ms. Pearson might not be the person in the 
photograph. (Id pp. 222-223). Given the existence of the system as described by 
the several witnesses, Haltom felt justified in assuming that the date of birth had been 
checked. His went only for further verification of the identification of the woman. He 
checked her address, he checked her social security number, and he compared facial 
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features. (Id pp. 224-227). After doing so, he told Sapergueldiev that he was 
satisfied that she was the person pictured on the driver license. According to Haltom, 
he even lost his temper a bit with Sapergueldiev, who once again asked whether he 
was permitted to make the sale. "I kinda got a little frustrated and then I - 1 said, 
'What's the problem? It's her ID.'or something to that effect." (Id p. 226). Haltom 
was only implicated because he had gone the extra mile to prevent someone using 
a false I.D. to unlawfully purchase an adult item. If he had stayed up in his office and 
told the employee, "you are experienced enough, I trust your judgment," he would not 
have been implicated. Haltom's personal involvement in this incident does not 
support the charge. To the contrary, it shows an additional attempt to avoid a 
problem. In fact, Haltom is in the same position as the defendant in Larsen. who 
missed seeing something that was plainly visible. In this case, it simply was not what 
he was looking for, as Ms. Pearson had already been checked for age. 
Utah driver licenses are designed to preclude underage persons from 
purchasing alcohol. With that in mind, the words "minor" (meaning under 21) and 
a separate statement "under 21" are featured prominently on the license. (St. Ex. 1). 
The date of birth is less prominent, and it was not Haltom's regular responsibility to 
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investigate the license in this regard. To find that the evidence against Haltom is 
sufficient to sustain this charge necessitates a finding that the regular efforts by 
Haltom's employees to screen customers as to age were not reasonably calculated to 
achieve that goal. The evidence is to the contrary, and this clearly is an isolated 
instance. He cannot be expected to personally double-check every customer who 
comes into one of the numerous stores, even when he happens to be on the premises. 
The fact that he attempted to help out with a particular question on this occasion does 
not impose such a duty; and the duty was thus not violated. The evidence, as a matter 
of law, does not rise to the standard required by the appellate courts of the State of 
Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals erred when it lowered the standard of negligence applied 
to the conduct of Defendant, to that of simple negligence. It is in conflict with its 
previous decision in Larsen: and it violates Defendant's rights under the First 
Amendment and to Due Process of Law. It did so without notice to Haltom or the 
opportunity to contest it. 
The evidence produced by Plaintiff is not sufficient as a matter of law to 
33 
convict Defendant of the crime charged, that of dealing in material harmful to a 
minor. The evidence does not meet the required minimum for a finding of criminal 
negligence, the state of mind required for this conviction. 
DATED this T day of January, 2006. 
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THORNE, Judge: 
I^I John Vonderhaar Haltom appeals his conviction for dealing in 
material harmful to a minor, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code section 76-10-1206 (2000). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 On August 4, 2000, just a few days after Dr. John's Lingerie 
and Novelty store (Dr. John's) opened for business, police in 
Midvale, Utah, sent BP, a seventeen-year-old girl, into the store 
to attempt to buy an adult film. She entered the store and was 
soon thereafter approached by Vadim Saprgeuldiev (Vadim), who 
asked to see her identification. BP gave Vadim, who was an 
employee of Dr. John's but not actually on duty when BP entered, 
her driver license. He glanced at it and then gave it back and 
permitted her to shop. After wandering around the store for a 
few minutes, BP went to the adult video rack where she chose one 
at random and then went to the counter to make the purchase. As 
she shopped, Vadim called Haltom, a part owner of Dr. John's, to 
the counter and asked him how one could determine whether a 
license was authentic. Haltom informed Vadim that if BP 
attempted to purchase an adult video, he would show him. As BP 
approached the counter, Haltom asked her for her identification 
and she again produced her driver license. 
H3 Haltom took the license and examined it. Among the relevant 
information contained on the license were BP's photo, name, 
address, social security number, and her date of birth, which 
clearly showed that BP was born in December 1982 and was 
therefore just seventeen years old at the time. Haltom carefully 
compared BP to the photo and then asked her to recite her social 
security number--printed next to her date of birth--and her 
address. When she gave an address with a street name rather than 
coordinates, Haltom became concerned and asked her to clarify her 
answer. She responded with the proper coordinate address, which 
corresponded with the address on the license, and Haltom handed 
back the license. Vadim then asked Haltom if he could sell the 
video to BP and Haltom answered "What's the problem? It's her 
I.D. [and] she's eighteen, right?" Vadim completed the sale as 
Haltom was talking with BP and she left the store. 
f4 Soon thereafter, BP returned to the store with Detective 
Brimley, the Midvale City Police officer who had sent her into 
Dr. John's. Brimley informed Haltom that he had sold an adult 
video to a minor--BP--and BP identified Vadim and Haltom as the 
people she had dealt with during the transaction. Haltom was 
arrested for dealing with material harmful to a minor, in 
violation of Utah Code section 76-10-1206 (2000) . 
1(5 Prior to trial, Haltom petitioned to have the charges 
dismissed because, he argued, he had been entrapped as a matter 
of law. The State responded and a hearing was scheduled, during 
which Haltom presented just one witness--Curtis Gorman, a former 
employee who had been fired for stealing from Haltom and who had 
been referred to the Midvale Police Department by Haltom for that 
theft. Haltom argued that Brimley had established a relationship 
with Vadim, and that Brimley had used Vadim as a police agent to 
induce Haltom to sell the video to BP. Through Gorman's 
testimony, Haltom introduced evidence that Brimley was interested 
in subverting a Dr. John's employee, and that, at Brimley's 
urging, Gorman had talked with Vadim about meeting with Brimley. 
But, Gorman never again met with Brimley and he had no idea 
whether Brimley had been able to talk with Vadim, or if, assuming 
such an encounter occurred, Vadim had agreed to work with 
Brimley. Consequently, the trial court denied Haltom1s motion, 
but informed all parties that Haltom would be given the 
opportunity to present his entrapment claim to the jury as a 
factual defense to the charge. 
^6 The case was subsequently tried in front of a jury, which 
convicted Haltom. Haltom filed a post-trial motion to arrest the 
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judgment, which the trial court denied, and he was sentenced to a 
statutory term of imprisonment of zero to five years in prison. 
The trial court, however, suspended all but thirty days of that 
time and placed Haltom on probation. Haltom now appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW1 
1(7 Haltom argues that the trial court erred in concluding that 
he had not been entrapped as a matter of law. The trial court's 
decision presents a mixed question of fact and law. See State v. 
Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Although we review 
factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions for 
correctness, due to the factually sensitive nature of entrapment 
cases we will affirm the trial court's decision "unless we can 
hold, based on the given facts, that reasonable minds cannot 
differ as to whether entrapment occurred." Id. Only when 
reasonable minds could not differ can we find entrapment as a 
matter of law. See id. 
%B Haltom next argues that the trial court erred in concluding 
that certain testimony was inadmissible hearsay. "Whether a 
^Although on appeal Haltom argues that his due process 
rights were violated when Brimley erased the audio tape made 
during his interview with Gorman, he failed to preserve this 
argument below. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63,^13, 95 P.3d 276 
(stating "appellate courts will not consider an issue, including 
constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal 
unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves 
exceptional circumstances"); see also State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 
7-8 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Had Haltom preserved this issue "[t]he 
materiality required to reverse a criminal conviction for . . . 
destruction of evidence as a denial of due process is more than 
evidentiary materiality." State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1363 
(Utah 1983) . "The evidence must be material in a constitutional 
sense." State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) . To meet this threshold, Haltom must show that the 
"'evidence is vital to the issues of whether [he] is guilty of 
the charge and whether there is a fundamental unfairness that 
requires the Court to set aside [his] conviction.'" Id. (quoting 
State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985)). Haltom does not 
meaningfully assert that anything on the destroyed tape satisfies 
this burden, and in fact, Gorman's version of the taped interview 
largely agreed with Brimley's version. Thus, it is questionable 
whether Haltom would have been able to demonstrate harm resulting 
from the destruction of the tape. Nevertheless, because he 
failed to preserve this issue in the trial court, we will not 
address the substance of the argument here. 
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statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted is a 
question of law, which we review under a correction of error 
standard." State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
19 Haltom also argues that the trial court's decision on the 
relevance of certain statutory changes to the format of minors1 
driver licenses was incorrect. "While relevant evidence is 
generally admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to 
determine whether proffered evidence is relevant, and we will 
find error . . . only if the trial court has abused its 
discretion." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (citation omitted). 
HlO Finally, Haltom argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction both as a matter of law and of fact. 
Haltom's argument falls into two categories. First, he asserts 
that his activities did not constitute a violation of section 76-
10-1206 as a matter of law, which under these circumstances 
presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review 
for correctness. See State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,1137, 52 P.3d 
1210. Second, he asserts that the evidence was not sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict. "[W]hen reviewing a claim of 
insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict." State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 
1146, 1150 (Utah 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
[^11 Haltom first argues that the trial court erred in failing to 
dismiss the complaint because he was entrapped as a matter of 
law. "Utah has never recognized a per se rule of entrapment." 
State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Instead, 
Utah has adopted an objective standard through which all 
entrapment claims will be examined, with the focus on whether the 
police conduct created "a substantial risk that a normal law-
abiding person would be induced to commit a crime." State v. 
Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also State 
v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 500 (Utah 1979) (stating that the 
objective view asks whether "the conduct of the government 
comport[s] with a fair and honorable administration of justice"). 
Under an objective standard, law enforcement officials are not 
denied the use of decoys. See Taylor, 599 P.2d at 500. Nor are 
police prohibited from using people that a defendant might 
consider to be a friend. See Martinez, 848 P.2d at 707 (stating 
"the mere existence of a personal relationship does not establish 
entrapment"). Instead, the focus of our objective test is on 
examining whether the government conduct created or manufactured 
a crime. See Taylor, 599 P.2d at 500-01 ("Nothing can be more 
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reprehensible than to induce the commission of crime for the 
purpose of apprehending and convicting the perpetrator." 
(quotations and citation omitted)). Consequently, to determine 
whether an entrapment has occurred fact finders are required to 
examine whether law officers, or their agents, induced "the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence . . . by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be 
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it." Beddoes, 890 
P.2d at 3 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
1l2 Haltom argues that he would not have sold an adult video to 
a minor in the absence of Vadim's alleged relationship with 
Brimley. However, at best, the evidence Haltom offered in 
support of this assertion is subject to multiple interpretations, 
ranging from the one offered by Haltom--that Vadim became an 
agent of the State--to the one offered by the State--that Vadim 
did nothing to assist Brimley's crusade against Dr. John's. 
Moreover, had the evidence of Vadim's relationship with the State 
been less tenuous, this alone is still insufficient to establish 
entrapment as a matter of law. See id. (noting that exploitation 
of a relationship is a necessary factor to meet the requirements 
of entrapment). This is especially true given Haltom's decision 
to ask BP for her identification and examine it. Once he did 
this, there is no evidence that Vadim attempted to coerce or 
convince Haltom to ignore her date of birth, or that Vadim told 
Haltom that he had already checked the birthdate and that there 
was no need to do so again. Rather than an issue that could be 
settled as a matter of law, Haltom presented the trial court with 
evidence that could have supported Haltom's entrapment defense, 
but that also could have been interpreted as insignificant. 
Consequently, because reasonable minds easily could differ on the 
question of entrapment as a matter of law in this case, the trial 
court properly denied Haltom's motion.2 See id. 
i|l3 Haltom next argues that the trial court erred in suppressing 
a portion of Theresa Ferrone's testimony as inadmissible hearsay. 
Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as "a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant . . ., offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. 
Evid. 801(c). "'[I]f an out-of-court statement is "offered 
simply to prove that it was made, without regard to whether it 
was true, such testimony is not proscribed by the hearsay 
rule."!n In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(quoting State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993)). "To the 
extent that there is no factual dispute, whether a statement is 
2Haltom presents no challenge to the jury's refusal to 
accept his entrapment defense as a matter of fact. 
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offered for the truth of the matter asserted is a question of 
law, which we review under a correction of error standard." Id. 
(quotations, citation, and alteration omitted). 
Hl4 Haltom argues that the trial court erred in concluding that 
he was offering Ferrone's testimony concerning a conversation 
with Vadim for the truth of the matter asserted. Specifically, 
Haltom suggests that Ferrone's testimony was offered to bolster 
Haltom's claim that Vadim was an expert in the store's policies 
and accepted methods for identifying and excluding minors from 
the premises. Assuming that Haltom's version of the testimony is 
correct, we do not believe that the statements were offered for 
the truth of the matter asserted.3 In fact, the excluded 
statement would have done nothing more than support Haltom's 
claim that Vadim was the store trainer and that he was quite 
aware of the store policy concerning the admission of minors. 
1|l5 However, the trial court's erroneous exclusion of Vadim's 
statements does not necessarily require the reversal of Haltom's 
conviction. "' [W]e do not upset the verdict of a jury merely 
because some error or irregularity may have occurred, but will do 
so only if it is something substantial and prejudicial in the 
sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence 
there would have been a different result.'" State v. Hutchison, 
655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982) (quoting State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 
1326, 1329 (Utah 1980)). "Where evidence is excluded by the 
trial court and the substance of such evidence is later admitted 
through some other means, any error which may have resulted is 
cured." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,1(29, 994 P.2d 177. Here, 
although the trial court disallowed Haltom's attempt to use 
Vadim's own words to support Haltom's assertion that Vadim knew 
the store policy well enough to train others, Haltom was able to 
present other evidence of Vadim's role as Dr. John's trainer. 
For instance, Haltom's long-time employee Bonnie Bolton testified 
that she was trained by Vadim on how to "card" potential patrons 
to ensure that they were not minors. During Haltom's testimony, 
he identified Vadim as "a senior employee," one sufficiently 
experienced to appear in the background of a Dr. John's 
promotional video carding potential customers. He further 
testified that he brought Vadim in from Nebraska to train the 
Utah employees and that Vadim was a trusted employee. Thus, 
3During her direct examination, Ferrone was asked if Vadim 
had provided her with any instruction or training in addition to 
that provided by Haltom. She responded "Vadim just told me, you 
know, you need to check every I.D. . . ."at which point the 
State objected. The court sustained the objection. The State 
offered no reason for its objection, but the court informed 
Haltom that "[a]ny hearsay is off." 
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although the jury was not presented with Vadim's statements, 
ample evidence of Vadim's knowledge was presented to the jury 
through other avenues. Thus, even though the trial court erred 
in suppressing the statement, the error was not harmful. See, 
e.g., State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 697-98 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (concluding that trial court's error was harmless because 
sufficient similar evidence was presented to the jury to render 
the error harmless). 
Kl6 Haltom also argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
attempt to introduce subsequent legislative changes to the format 
of driver licenses for minors. "While relevant evidence is 
generally admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to 
determine whether proffered evidence is relevant, and we will 
find error in a relevancy ruling only if the trial court has 
abused its discretion." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted). "'Relevant evidence' 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401; see also Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at 
127. 
1l7 The trial court in this instance did not exceed the 
permitted range of its discretion. Haltom's defense was never 
predicated on a claim that he was unfamiliar with the format of 
Utah's driver licenses, or that he was confused by BP's 
identification in particular. Instead, his defense centered 
entirely upon his reliance on Dr. John's policy of precluding 
minors from the premises, his expectation that his employees 
would not fail in enforcing the policy, and his claim that the 
Midvale police used Vadim to entrap Haltom. The subsequent 
legislative changes to the driver license format were irrelevant 
to the defenses offered by Haltom, and therefore we conclude that 
the trial court acted well within its permitted range of 
discretion in refusing to allow Haltom to introduce evidence of 
the changes. 
i|l8 Haltom's final and most forceful argument is that the 
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict him of 
dealing in materials harmful to a minor. More concisely, Haltom 
asserts that the State failed to prove that he violated the 
statute when he sold the video to BP. To address Haltom's 
challenge properly, we must first determine the culpable mental 
state required to violate section 76-10-1206. Only after doing 
so can we examine the merits of his argument. 
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119 Section 76-10-1206 states: 
A person is guilty of dealing in material 
harmful to minors when, knowing that a person 
is a minor, or having failed to exercise 
reasonable care in ascertaining the proper 
age of a minor, he: 
(a) intentionally distributes or offers 
to distribute; exhibits or offers to 
exhibit to a minor any material harmful 
to minors. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (2003) (emphasis added). "When 
interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince the true 
intent and purpose of the Legislature." State v. Martinez, 2002 
UT 80, 1J8, 52 P.3d 1276 (quotations and citations omitted). "To 
discover^that intent, we look first to the plain language of the 
statute." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,1(34, 52 P.3d 1210 
(quotations and citation omitted). "When examining the statutory 
language we assume the legislature used each term advisedly and 
in accordance with its ordinary meaning." Martinez, 2002 UT 80 
at %8. "[T]hus, the statutory words are read literally, unless 
such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Bluff, 
2002 UT 66 at ^34 (quotations and citation omitted). 
"Furthermore, we 'avoid interpretations that will render portions 
of a statute superfluous or inoperative.1" Martinez, 2002 UT 80 
at 18 (quoting Hall v. State Pepf t of Corr., 2001 UT 34,1(15, 24 
P.3d 958). 
1(2 0 At issue in the instant case is the meaning of the phrase 
"having failed to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the 
proper age." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (emphasis added).4 
"Reasonable care" is defined as "[t]hat degree of care which a 
person of ordinary prudence would exercise in the same or similar 
circumstances, [and f]ailure to exercise such care is ordinary 
negligence." Black's Law Dictionary 1265 (6th ed. 1990). Haltom 
has presented us with no reason to believe that the legislature 
intended a different meaning, or with any case law that would 
support his position in the face of this language. Compare State 
v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376, 378-79 (Utah 1983) (concluding that the 
legislature's use of the term "negligence" warranted a conclusion 
4The statute also creates liability for selling "harmful 
material" to someone the seller knows to be a minor. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (2003). However, Haltom is not, and 
has never been, accused of actually knowing that BP was a minor 
at the time of the sale. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to 
Haltom*s failure to determine BP's age and whether that failure 
violated the statute. 
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that the elements of automobile homicide were met if the state 
could show that the defendant had been simply negligence, and not 
criminally negligent), with State v. Larson, 2000 UT 106,1(17-18, 
999 P.2d 1252 (noting that the legislature intended criminal 
negligence to be the applicable mens rea for negligent homicide 
when it used the term "criminal negligence" in the statute). 
Although section 76-12-1206 uses neither of the terms "simple 
negligence" or "ordinary negligence," it does contain the phrase 
"reasonable care." "Reasonable care" carries with it a commonly 
accepted definition, and thus, we are bound by its meaning. 
Consequently, we conclude that a person violates section 76-10-
1206 if they act with simple or ordinary negligence in failing to 
discover that the recipient of "harmful material" is a minor, 
prior to providing the material. 
f21 Having determined the simple negligence is sufficient to 
violate section 76-10-1206, we turn our attention to examining 
whether the evidence here was sufficient to support Haltom's 
conviction.5 "In making the determination as to whether there is 
sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction, an appellate court 
does not sit as a second fact finder." State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 
1146, 1150 (Utah 1991). "[W]hen reviewing a claim of 
insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence and all inferences 
that may be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict." Id. 
f22 The jury was presented with evidence that BP entered Dr. 
John's, that she selected an adult video, and that she took it to 
the counter. There, Haltom asked her for her identification 
after Vadim called him over and asked him to demonstrate how to 
confirm the authenticity of a person's identification. BP gave 
Haltom her driver license, and Haltom compared the picture on the 
5Although Haltom's conviction was based on the jury's 
finding that he was reckless when he sold the video, this error 
is not fatal to his conviction. See State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 
3 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("[W]e may not interfere with a jury 
verdict unless upon review of the entire record, there emerges 
error of sufficient gravity to indicate that a defendant's rights 
were prejudiced in a substantial manner." (quotations and 
citation omitted)). The trial court's instruction forced the 
State to meet a higher mens rea standard than required under the 
statute, and because the principles underlying "simple 
negligence" are incorporated within the definition of 
recklessness, the jury must have, by necessity, found Haltom also 
to be negligent when they determined that he had been reckless. 
Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-104 (2003). Therefore, although the 
trial court erred in instructing the jury, the error could not 
have prejudiced Haltom and was thus harmless. 
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license to BP. Satisfied that the picture was indeed of BP, he 
asked her to confirm virtually every piece of material 
information on the license, including her address and social 
security number, but oddly not her date of birth. BP answered 
all of his questions, but Haltom became suspicious when the 
address she provided did not match the street address on the 
license. However, when questioned further, she provided an 
equivalent coordinate address that was identical to the one on 
the license. Satisfied that the identification was hers, Haltom 
instructed Vadim to sell BP the video. 
1(23 Examining all of these facts, and the inferences that can be 
drawn from them, in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
we conclude that, as a factual matter, the evidence was 
sufficient. Haltom held the license and examined it to ensure 
that it was authentic. He read every line material to ensuring 
the authenticity except the date of birth. Thus we cannot say 
that the jury's decision that Haltom's behavior did not 
constitute "reasonable care" is unsupported. 
[^24 Haltom responds that the defense he presented eliminated any 
possible negligence finding as a matter of law. We disagree. At 
trial Haltom argued that it was, and is, Dr. John's policy to 
exclude from the store everyone under the age of eighteen. Under 
the policy, every patron's identification was checked at the 
door, so he argues that it was reasonable for him to assume that 
she was over eighteen when she reached the counter. The State 
countered that in the few days that the store was operating in 
Midvale before Haltom's arrest, the officer who eventually 
arrested Haltom had twice entered the store without being 
subjected to the "mandatory" identification check. The State 
also pointed to BP's presence in the store as evidence that Dr. 
John's policy was at best sporadically enforced. Thus, the jury 
was presented with conflicting information concerning Dr. John's 
policy, and it was left to determine whether the policy alone 
amounted to "[t]hat degree of care which a person of ordinary 
prudence would exercise in the same or similar circumstances." 
Black's Law Dictionary 1265 (6th ed. 1990). 
^25 Even accepting Haltom's argument that a policy could be used 
to immunize him from prosecution--which is a position we do not 
necessarily accept--the evidence concerning the application of 
this policy was conflicting. Consequently, it was the role of 
the jury to determine whether the policy, and Haltom's claimed 
reliance upon it, amounted to the reasonable care required by 
section 76-10-1206. Cf. Little Am. Ref. Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 
112, 114 (Utah 1982) ("The jury is entrusted to resolve all 
relevant questions of fact presented to the court. The questions 
of fact include findings of negligence [.]") . The jury determined 
that Haltom had been reckless, and by implication that he had 
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violated section 76-10-1206's duty of reasonable care, when he 
sold the video to BP. Consequently, we conclude that Haltom's 
conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
1|26 The trial court properly denied Haltom's motion to dismiss 
the charges because Haltom failed to show that he had been 
entrapped as a matter of law. The court erred in denying Haltom 
the opportunity to introduce testimony concerning Vadim's out of 
court statements, but Haltom was given the opportunity to present 
evidence to the jury that was sufficiently similar to the 
excluded testimony rendering the trial court's error harmless. 
Finally, a showing of simple negligence is sufficient to support 
a conviction under section 76-10-1206's expectation of 
"reasonable care." The jury found that Haltom failed to use 
reasonable care in selling an adult video to BP and the evidence 
supports its verdict. 
%21 Accordingly, we affirm Haltom's conviction. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
1f2 8 WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
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Armina LEE, d/b/a Brass Bull, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v« 
The CITY OP NEWPORT, et al., 
Defendants-Appellees • 
No. 91-5158* 
Nov. 5, 1931. 
On Appeal from the United States 
District Court for the Eastern 
District of Kentucky, No. 91-00613; 
Bertilswan, D,J, 
E.D.Ky. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Before MILBURN and SUHRHEINRICH, 
Circuit Judges, and JORDAN, District 
"trudgen—mr*1 
LEOlvJ JGRDAN, District Judge. 
**1 This is an appeal from the 
judgment of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern 
District of Kentucky. The 
determinative issue in this civil 
{6th Cir.(Ky>))) 
rights action pursuant to 42 U-S-C. 
§ 1983 is the constitutionality of 
certain provisions of an ordinance 
enacted by the City of Newport; 
Kentucky, Ordinance No. 26-39. 
This ordinance purports to be an 
occupational licensing provision 
under which the plaintiff's license 
to operate an entertainment 
establishment known as the Brass 
Bull in Newport was suspended and 
conditionally revoked. The 
plaintiff sought injunctive relief 
in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Kentucky, which 
denied the application for 
injunctive relief following a 
hearing. The plaintiff has 
appealed and for the reasons stated 
below this Court reverses the 
judgment of the District Court. 
I. FACTS 
A hearing on the plaintiff1 s 
application for injunctive relief 
was held in the Eastern District of 
Kentucky on January 31, 1991. Most 
of the facts surrounding the 
suspension cf the plaintiff's 
occupational license are not 
disputed, [FKriJ The ordinance at 
issue, section 25-39, provides in 
relevant part: 
"-f-ai—:ftny—rrcens-e~^ s-su^ d--i^ nTJeir^ rirs-
di vis ion may, with notice to the 
holder thereof and a hearing as 
hereinafter provided for, be revoked 
or suspended by the Board of 
Commissioners. 
(1) If, within twelve months prior 
to the date on which charges are 
1 
filed, there nas been a conviction 
of any licensee or his agent, 
servants or employees, for any 
action or activity occurring in, on, 
or at the premises covered by the 
license, in violation of any 
provision of this division or any 
other division of the City cf 
Newport, or of any criminal cr penal 
statute of the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky against gambling, 
disorderly conduct, cr any other 
criminal or penal offense, and a 
judgment of conviction in any court 
of competent jurisdiction shall be 
conclusive evidence of such 
violation.... 
11
 (b) ... Upon a decision ay the 
Board of Commissioners to revoke or 
suspend a license issued under this 
division, all business activity at 
that location shall cease 
immediately for the period of 
suspension or revocation.8 
(Emphasis added-) [FW2] 
The plaintiff is the owner and 
operator of the Brass Bull, an adult 
oriented nightclub. she has 
operated the nightclub since 
September, 1984, and has been issued 
an occupational license for every 
year of operation; the last such 
license was issued in July, 1990. 
Ms: Lee testified that at the time 
of the last license renewal, she was 
aware that two of her employees had 
he^n convicted of acts of 
prostitution, one of whom was 
convicted twice, that occurred on 
the premises of the Brass Bull. 
Prior1 X7rTKH~XSlIeirai' 7^heY"^TreTO?eT' 
one of these employees nad bzan 
terminated by the plaintiff and the 
other had left her job voluntarily. 
As of July 1, 1S90, the plaintiff 
was not offering nude dancing at her 
club, since she had her liquor 
license at that time, but was 
offering seminude dancing, J.A. 
57-59. 
**2 On October 25, 1990, the City 
of Newport 'the City) issued the 
plaintiff a notice to revoke her 
license. This notice was/ received 
oy her in early November. Prior to 
the issuance of the notice, the 
plaintiff decided tc offer nude 
dancing as entertainment and thus 
surrendered her liquor license to 
the City and the State of Kentucky. 
J.A. 16, 55-61. 
The City's notice of revocation was 
based on the three convictions of 
two employees for prostitution in 
May, 1990. The plaintiff's 
uncontradicted testimony was that 
she was not aware of prostitution cr 
solicitation occurring on the 
premises cf the Brass Bull prior to 
these convictions. She hae all her 
employees sign a contract in which 
they are notified that prostitution 
will not be permitted on the 
premises. She stated that she 
neither condones nor encourages such 
conduct and that any employee who rs 
found engaging in this conduct is 
fired immediately. She holds 
weekly meetings with ner employees 
as part of her efforts to oversee 
their activities. She assigns 
other employees to supervise the 
employees and has instructed them as 
to how such conduct is to be 
handled. These precautions had 
been used by her since at least 
April, 1990. The plaintiff stated 
m her testimony at the hearing on 
her application for injunctive 
r^ei-iref~tiTat~try-" o^fi^ing~mrde~ddJicaTi^ 
she was better able to prevent 
prostitution since she removed the 
booths from the club, turned up the 
lighting, eliminated the sale of 
alcohol, and prohibited ail contact 
between the dancers and customers. 
J.A. 61-62, 68. 
In a letter from the City's law 
department, dated November 30r 1991, 
the City offered to settle the 
revocation proceeding if the 
plaintiff would cease offering nude 
dancing and reactivate her liquor 
license. Another settlement offer 
had been made on November 19, 1990. 
The plaintiff • declined the 
settlement offers. J.A. 23-24, 63-
64. 
On January 21, 1991, a revocation 
hearing was held before the City 
commissioners. The plaintiff was 
present and testified. She 
explained the efforts she made to 
control her employees and offered 
other evidence of the precautions 
she had taken to prevent 
prostitution on the premises. This 
evidence was uncontrovsrted by the 
City. J.A. 64-67. 
At the hearing in the District 
Court ten days later; the plaintiff 
stated on cross-examination that she 
was working in the club the night on 
which two of her employees were 
cited for prostitution. She 
testified, however, that she saw no 
indication that these employees were 
engaged in illegal conduct. These 
two employees were not arrested by 
the undercover officer on the same 
night as their violations and the 
plaintiff stated that she had no 
knowledge of the violations until 
the latter part of April, 1990. 
J.A. 77-78. 
James Parsons testified on behalf 
~of—the—e±tyi **r^—Par sons—i-s—the-
city manager and has held this 
position since October lr 1339. 
His responsibilities include filing 
charges against occupational 
licensees whose licenses may be 
subject to revocation or suspension. 
He filed the charges against the 
plaintiff. While the City has 
established regulations governing 
the conduct of businesses engaged in 
selling alcohol, every business in 
the City is required to obtain and 
maintain an occupational - license. 
J.A. 80-82, 114. . 
**3 The charges against the 
plaintiff were based on these three 
prostitution convictions obtained in 
Hay, 1990. The charges were lodged 
on October 25, 199 0, against the 
plaintiff. He stated that the City 
was aware at the time that these 
charges were brought that the 3rass 
Bull was offering nude dancing but 
stated that this fact had no effect 
on the City's decision. Mr. 
Parsons was present at the hearing 
held by the City in January, 1991, 
on the revocation of the plaintiff's 
license. As a result of this 
hearing, the plaintiff's license was 
suspended for s ix months and she was 
placed on probation/ during which 
period of probation another 
violation would have resulted in the 
revocation of her occupational 
license. J.A. 82-B5. 
Unsupported by the record of the 
hearing before the City 
commissioners, Mr. Parsons offered 
his opinion that the City imposed 
suspension rather than revocation 
because the plaintiff attempted to 
exercise more control over the 
activities of her employees in her 
business than did another licensee 
whose charges had been heard by the 
City commissioners on the same day. 
Mr. Parsons testified that 
pros -^irtrfci t-i-e&—&£#e-e£«—^e~-^Uki^i£y— 
of downtown businesses because 
customers tend to avoid the downtown 
shopping district due to these kinds 
of illegal activities. He further 
stated that since many acts of 
prostitution are performed by the 
employees of establishments like the 
plaintiff's, the City was attempting 
3 
to make these establishments assume 
responsibility for the conduct of 
their employees to prevent 
prostitution from occurring. J.A. 
86-87. 
At the January hearings, the City 
offered no evidence tnat the 
plaintiff had not in fact taken 
Bteps to control the behavior of the 
Brass Bull's employees. No notice 
was given to the plaintiff that the 
City was concerned about the degree 
or extent of control she exercised 
over her employees. No criminal 
charg* was brought against the 
plaintiff for permitting 
prostitution to occur on the 
premises of the Brass Bull. [FN31 
J.A. 93-94-
Re denied that the City was 
motivated hy a desire to eliminate 
nude dancing in Newport in taking 
its actions against the plaintiff. 
The City is investigating 
occupational license violations m 
other businesses and not all nude 
dancing , establishments have been 
charged with- license violations, 
No charges have, however, been 
processed against or are pending 
agains- any other kind of business 
than adult oriented establishments. 
Nothing in the occupational license 
ordinance expressly permits the 
decision maker to consider any 
mitigating factors in the 
determination of whether to revoke 
or suspend a license and no standard 
governs the decision maker's 
discretion as tc the nature of the 
"""peircrlTy for"-a"-v±atrcittrr: iJ-rA: S6- " 
58, 103-106. 
Mr. Parsons admitted that he and 
the City commissioners have publicly 
expressed their opposition to adult 
entertainment establishments. 
These same commissioners had the 
authority to make the revocation 
decision ccnceming the plaintiff1 s 
club. He testified that studies 
have"been conducted that indicate a 
correlation between prostitution, 
both in "he clubs and in the 
neighborhood cf the clubs, and the 
operation of adult? oriented 
establishments- J.A. 111- 113. 
**4 In the written decision of the 
Board" of Commissioners, the City 
found that three charges of 
prostitution had been alleged to 
have occurred on the premises on the 
same evening and had subsequently 
been reduced to convictions. Based 
on these convictions, the 
Commissioners then found the 
plaintiff guilty of a violation of 
section 26-35(a)(1) and thus 
temporarily suspended and 
conditionally revoked her 
occupational license. J.A. 2-7-28. 
Following the hearing on the 
p^ aintiff's application for 
injunctive relief, the District 
Court entered its findings of fact 
and conclusion of law. The 
District Court recognized that at 
the hearing before the Commissioners 
Ehe uncontradicted testimony of the 
plaintiff was that she had taken 
•precautions •. • to prevent 
prostitution, and denied any 
awareness that prostitution had 
taken place." The plaintiff did 
not deny that act3 of prostitution 
aid occur on the premises of the 
club. J.A- 29, 34, 38. 
As to the plaintiffs claim that 
ch-e-or dxnancrer-tttr^srsne- ^ a t e t r e ± - f t e r - -
aue process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it did 
not require that she have knowledge 
of the conduct of her employees and 
imposed strict liability for such 
conduct, the District Court rejected 
thig contention based on its 
conclusion that the police powers 
4 
permitted the City to define the 
violation so long as the ordinance 
has a rational basis between its 
requirements or penalties and a 
legitimate governmental purpose, 
inferring that sines the plaintiff 
worked on the premises six days a 
week, she should be presumed to be 
aware or should be aware of any acts 
of prostitution that occurred in the 
club. The Court addressed the 
other issues raised by the plaintiff 
and concluded that no injunction 
should issue. J.A. 3 8-3 9, 45. 
II. ANALYSIS 
While the plaintiff has raised a 
number of issues, the Court has 
concluded that the issue concerning 
her lack of knowledge of the acts of 
prostitution that occurred on the 
premises is determinative. The 
effect of the ordinance is either tc 
create a presumption of knowledge or 
to eliminate any requirement of 
knowledge on the part of the 
licensee or operator of illegal 
activities or prohibited conduct on 
the premises based simply on the 
fact of a conviction of a licensee's 
employee- The District Court was 
persuaded that "it is not an 
irrational presumption that if 
prostitution were occurring she: did 
know or should have known.rt u.A. 
29. Since the plaintiff's 
uncontradicted evidence was 
diametrically contrary to this 
finding by the District Court, the 
District Court effectively applied 
an irrebuttable presumption but one 
TRIE " pre'SramSTTHr^ ffcr"^  
necessarily or universally true-" 
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 
95 S.Ct- 2457, 2468 (1975) . 
In assessing the constitutionality 
of a presumption, its operation on a 
protectable right, such as the 
property interest at stake in the 
present case, to preclude a licensee 
from putting on evidence in defense 
or from having that evidence 
meaningfully considered can result 
in a violation of the guarantee of 
due process embodied in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.-
**5 rt ' [W]hat procedures due 
process may require under any given 
set of circumstances must begin with 
a determination of the precise 
nature of the government function 
involved as well as of the private 
interest that has been affected by 
governmental action.' " 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
22 S.Ct- 1208, 1212 (1972) 
(citations omitted) . One of the 
fundamental purposes of the due 
process clauses of the Constitution 
"
 T
 is to allow the aggrieved party 
the opportunity to present his case 
and have its merits fairly judged.' 
* Okeson v. Tolley School District 
NO, 25, 760 P.2d 864, 863 (8th 
Cir.), on reh 766 F.2d 37B (8th 
Cir.l9B5) (citation omitted). 
Tha City has exercised its police 
powers to require occupational 
licenses for all businesses 
conducted within its jurisdiction. 
In particular, it oversees adult 
criented establishments based on 
studies showing a correlation 
between the operation of such 
establishments and certain criminal 
activities. The City is attempting 
to induce the operators of these 
establishments to take 
-respon:s±b±i-irry—for—tite—eon-dttefe—e-f-
empioyees who engage in illegal or 
prohibited activities by threatening 
suspension or revecation of their 
occupational licenses. The City 
hopes that the reduction of the 
level of such activities would help 
reinvigorate the downtown shopping 
district. The Court does not 
intend to question the validity of 
rftis public policy or of the City's' 
interest in preserving the viability 
o£ its downtown business district* 
The question in this case is whether 
the means adopted by the City to 
attempt to achieve these goals are 
constitutional. More specifically 
seated, the question is whether the 
application of a conclusive or 
irrebuttable presumption or the 
elimination of any knowledge 
requirements is consistent with 
meaningful due process in this case? 
The right to pursue an occupation 
is a protected property right that 
is subject to reasonable regulation. 
Wilkeraon v. Johnson, 699 F,2d 325/ 
328 (Stii Cir.1983) . Moreover, once 
a license or permit to engage in 
some activity regulated by the St.ate 
is issued by a - State, it is a 
property right that cannot be denied 
without adequate due process. Bell 
v, Burscn, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 
1586 (1971} , Furthermore, in the 
present case, the plaintiff engages 
in a "business that involves the 
exercise of First Amendment'rights. 
Revocation precludes the licensee 
from operating the business and thus 
even a temporary suspension or 
revocation will have substantial 
consequences for a licensee. 
"License revocations are so serious 
as to be treated ' "in the nature of 
criminal proceedings." ' . .. 
Procedural requirements are 
therefore rigorous for a license 
revocation proceeding." Richards v. 
SntanuneL~--CouiiLy—Ho3piLa±~ifotrhax i cy: 
603 F.Supp. Si, 85 (S.D.Ga.1984) 
•6'iting American Optometric 
Association, Inc., 379 F.Supp. 175 
(tf.D.Ga.), affi'd 491 U*S. 386 
(1974)), A licensee is thus 
entitled to have the opportunity to 
be heard both at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner. Barry 
v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 99 S.Ct. 
2642, 2650 (1979). As the Supreme 
CPurt observed in Stanley, 
**€
 M[p]rocedure hyf presumption is 
always chea-cev and easier than 
individualized determination. But, 
when . . . the procedure forecloses 
the determinative issues ..., when 
it explicitly disdains present 
realities in deference to past 
formalities, it needlessly risks 
running roughshod over the important 
interests of" 
a licensee in the conduct of her 
business and the exercise of First 
Amendment rights. 92 S.Ct. at 1215. 
The presumption applied by the 
District Court is entirely 
distinguishable from that permitted 
joy the Supreme Court in Usery v. 
Turner Eikhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 
1, 96 S.Ct* 2882 (1976), in which 
tr~e Supreme Court upheld the 
presumption that persons with 
certain findings regarding 
pneumoconiosis would be entitled to 
disability compensation- Since the 
statute at issue in Turner Elkhorn 
Mining Co. was purely an economic 
regulation that did not touch on or 
affect fundamental rights, the Court 
found no difficulty in accepting a 
legislative determination 
(presumption) that evidence of 
disability in certain instances 
w£uld require payment of total 
disability compensation. Id., at 
2696* Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 95 
S.Ct.- at 2469-2470. What is 
-TK3irevort^ y'^ fooutr-T^  
Turner Blkhcrn is that it does not 
prevent any person from conducting a 
business or engaging in an 
occupation, particularly one 
implicating the exercise of First 
Amendment rights, and rather is part 
of remedial social legislation. See 
also Burlington Northern Railroad 
6 
Co. -v. Department of Public Service 
Regulation, 763 F.2dllQ6, 1113 (9th 
Cir.1985). 
in Vlandis v_ Kline, 412 U.s; 441, 
93 S.Ct. 2230 (1973), the Supreme 
Court of the United States observed 
that 
H[t]he State's interest in 
administrative ease and certainty 
cannot, in and of itself, . save [a] 
conclusive presumption from 
invalidity under the Due Process 
Clause where there are otherwise 
reasonable and practicable means of 
establishing the pertinent facts, on 
which the State's objective is 
premised. ... Rather, standards of 
due process require that the State 
allow such an individual the 
opportunity to present evidence. ..." 
93 S.Ct. at 2236. Due process 
afforded to a person prior to 
deprivation of a license must be 
meaningful and appropriate to the 
case: 
'•It is a proposition which hardly 
seems to need explication that a 
hearing which excludes consideration 
of an element essential to the 
decision whether licenses of the 
nature here involved shall be 
suspended does not meet this 
standard." 
Bell v. Burson, 91 S.Ct. at 1591. 
Another case involving the 
application of a presumption, Leary 
"vr—Drri-tHd—Store's -—3-3-5—iW:—fr;—»-
S.Ct. 1532 (1969), also rejecting 
administrative convenience a3 a 
basis for the existence of a 
presumption, emphasized that a 
presumptive inference of guilty 
knowledge based solely on presence 
at a place in which illegal activity 
occurs is generally arbitrary or 
irrational- Id., at 154B-1549. 
Unless "it can be said with 
substantial assurance that one in 
possession of [an adult oriented 
nightclub] is more likely than not 
to know that" prostitution was 
occurring on the premises of the 
nightclub, a presumption of 
knowledge cannot be conclusively 
applied to justify the revocation or 
suspension of a license to operate 
such a business. Id-, at 1553. 
**7 in addition, although the 
Pistrict Court presumed that the 
plaintiff knew that prostitution was 
occurring on the premises of the 
Brass Bull, the wording of the 
ordinance would not require the 
application of a presumption of 
knowledge to obtain a revocation. 
All that is necessary to warrant 
revocation under this ordinance as 
written is for any employee, 
servant, or agent of the licensee to 
have been convicted even once of 
violating any ordinance of the City 
or any criminal law of the State of 
Kentucky. Consequently, if a 
bookkeeper for the plaintiff was 
convicted of embezzlement from the 
plaintiff, the plaintiffs 
occupational license could be 
revoked, despite the fact that the 
plaintiff would be highly unlikely 
to kno^i that her bookkeeper was 
engaged in this kind of criminal 
activity, since if she were aware of 
it she would probably take some 
action to stop it. The ordinance 
is thus a strict liability provision 
and the District Court's finding of 
-presumed knowledge was—:—both-
unnecessary under the ordinance as 
drafted to obtain a revocation and 
created an essentially irrebuttable 
presumption that was contrary to the 
uncontested evidence that the 
plaintiff did not know that her 
employees were engaged in 
prostitution and that she took 
reasonable steps to attempt to 
prevent such conduct on her 
premises. Nothing that the 
plaintiff could have shown at her 
hearing before the City 
coTimissioners or in the District 
Court would have prevented the 
ordinance from being applied as 
written. Universal Restoration, 
Inc. v. United States. 798 F.2d 
14QD, 1406 (Fed-Cir.l986)Cf. . 
This ordinance is entirely unlike 
the statute upheld in Hvamstad v. 
Suhier, 915* F.2d 1213 (8th 
Cir.1990), in which a pattern of 
convictions was required to permit 
the abatement of a nuisance by city 
officials. Obviously, a pattern of 
convictions of which the operator is 
given or has notice provides 
knowledge that such conduct is 
occurring on the premises. As the 
Court of Appeals in Hvamstad noted, 
"the abatement statute ... is 
designed to encourage property 
owners to abate the basis for the 
nuisance themselves by delivering 
notice of the convictions to the 
owners." Id-, at 1220. Further, 
the statute in Hvamstad was limited 
to certain enumerated offenses 
related to the operation of the 
business and did not allow abatement 
proceedings to be premised en all 
types of convictions, whether or not 
reasonably related to the nature of 
the business being conducted. Hot 
all prohibitable conduct is 
necessarily related to a State's 
legitimate interest in regulating or 
licensing a particular occupation. 
A licensing regulation must: contain 
requirements that are "rationally 
related to an applicant's fitness 
for the occupation." Chalfy v. 
Turofif, 804 F.2d 20, 23 (2d 
Cir.1966) . See also Vruno v. 
Schwarswalder, 600 F.2d 124, 129-
130 (6th Cir.1979). The ordinance 
is net limited to offenses 
(prostitution, solicitation, service 
of minors, etc*) occurring on the 
premises that would be reasonably 
related to preventing or curing the 
purported social evils or secondary 
effects at which r the City is 
claiming to aim and rather extends 
to any conduct that would be a 
violation of a City ordinance or a 
Stats criminal law, such as 
embezzlement, regardless cf whether 
such a violation would have any 
relation to the kinds of problems 
that the City claims it was 
attempting ro prevent or to cure. 
The ordinance goes beyond the 
purposes of preventing or curing the 
secondary effects supposedly flowing 
from the operation of establishments 
like the Brass Bull and reaches 
conduct that, while may otherwise be 
prohibited by the State or its 
political subdivisions, would not 
result in or contribute to the 
secondary effects in the downtown 
area in which -chese establishments 
are located but would nevertheless 
permit the revocation of the 
plaintiff's license without 
achieving or furthering nhe City's 
purported goal of eliminating these 
secondary effects. [FN4] This is 
clearly arbitrary or irrational, 
**8 The ordinance permits the 
revocation of occupational licenses 
without any showing that the 
operator had any control over the 
conduct of employees or that the 
operator willfully ignored 
prohibited activities or otherwise 
knew—of";—shou-1 d-^ha-^e—known—a-fr,—oxr-
condoned illegal conduct on the part 
of the operator's employees, agents, 
or servants. Cf. Finer Foods Sales 
Co., Inc. v. Block, 703 F.2d 774, 
777-778 (D.C~ftpp*1983). A3 
recognized in Chulchian v. City of 
Indianapolis, 633 F.2d 27, 32 (7th 
Cir.1980), "because of the knowledge 
8 
requirement, the ordinance doe3 not 
penalize a licensee for an isolated 
incident over which he has no 
control." In contrast, in Genusa 
v. City • of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203 
(7th Cir.1980), the same Circuit 
Court of Appeals as decided 
Chulchian observed that an ordinance 
permitting revocation if the 
licensee allowed "anything to occur 
on licensed premises that is in any 
manner unlawful," id., at 1221, 
would be constitutional only " [o)n 
the assumption that [the City] does 
not mean by this provision to 
enlarge the licensee's vicarious 
criminal liability beyond 
traditional bounds » Id. 
Courts faced with similar 
provisions in State law have readily 
recognized that equal protection or 
due process guarantees are 
implicated when use of convictions 
unrelated to the government's 
legitimate purposes deprive a person 
of the right to engage in an 
occupation, often relying on Schware 
vr Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 
232, 77 S.Ct. 752 (1957), which held 
that any qualification or 
requirement for an occupation must 
bear a rational relation to the 
person's fitness to engage in the 
particular occupation or business, 
77 S.Ct. at 756, All such 
requirements must be tailored to 
promote the government's interest in 
regulation of the occupation, based 
on the nature of the crimes or 
offenses for which convictions may 
have been obtained and their 
""r^Tatrtun—to—the— fttnws—of—sfce-
licensee to engage in that 
particular occupation. See, e.g., 
. Gregg v. Laweon, 732 F.Supp. 84 9, 
854-856 (E.D.Tenn.1989); schanuel 
v. Anderson, 546 F.Supp. 519, 523-
524 (S.D.111.1982), aff'd 708 F.2d 
316 (7th Cir.1983). Without both a 
sufficient showing by the City that 
the plaintiff's fitness to operate 
the Brass Bull was affected by the 
conviction of any of her employees 
for acts of prostitution or other 
relevant criminal conduct committed 
on the premises, such as that she 
knew or should have known about or 
condoned such conduct, and without 
allowing the plaintiff the 
opportunity to present evidence in 
defense, fairly considered by the 
decision maker, the City may not 
revoke or suspend the plaintiffs 
occupational license m violation of 
her right to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment* 
Consequently, the provisions of the 
ordinance now under review cannot 
pass constitutional scrutiny under 
the rational relation test and thus 
violate the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. These 
provisions permit the City to 
deprive an operator of a protected 
property . interest without any 
relation to the evils at which the 
ordinance is allegedly aimed and, ' 
having no requirement that the 
operator know or should know from 
the circumstances that violations- of 
City ordinances or State statutes 
are occurring on the licensed 
premises, the ordinance precludes 
the licensee from showing that the 
licensee had no knowledge of any 
such violations. The ordinance 
thus constitutes an improper 
imposition of strict liability or 
creates an irrebuttable presumption 
and is overbroad. 
-I^ -lT~eONCljJ5SI-eN 
**9 Accordingly, the Court is cf 
the opinion that section 26-39(a)(l) 
of the ordinances of the City of 
Newport is unconstitutional as 
presently written. The order of the 
District Court for the Eastern 
District of Kentucky is REVERSED and 
this case is REMANDED for action 
consistent with nhe opinion of this 
Court. 
FN* The Honorable Leon Jordan, 
U.S. District Judge for the 
Eastern District of Tennessee, 
sitting by designation. 
?N1. All references to the 
record will be to the Joint 
Arman^ -iv of t-he _nart:ies, with 
the notation *J.A. r ana tne 
relevant page or pages in the 
Joint Appendix. 
FN2. Compare the provisions of 
the ordinance declared 
unconstitutional in Bayside 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 
470 F.Supp. 1149, 1142-1146 
(M.D.Fla.1979) . 
FN3. Nothing in the record 
indicates that a history of 
prostitution existed at the 
plaintiff's club and; rather, 
the record supports the 
conclusion that these were the 
first citations for such 
activities at the Brass Bull. 
FN4. While the court does not 
address the issue of whether 
the ordinance in the present 
context violates the First: 
Amendment, the Court notes 
-hat the Supreme Court 
recently held that nude 
dancing is not unprotected 
expression, Barnes v. Glen 
Theater, Inc., ill S.Ct. 2456, 
2463 (1991) , and this Court 
-has re^ "errtT3nd permit trrrxg-
cccupational licenses to be 
revoked when it would violate 
the First Amendment, City of 
Paducah v. investment 
Entertainment, Inc., 791 F.2d 
463, 469-470 (6th Cir.1986). 
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